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But then with me the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man's mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey's mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind? 





1. Evolutionary debunking arguments in three domains

Two traditional targets for evolutionary scepticism are religion and morality. Evolutionary sceptical arguments against religious belief are continuous with earlier genetic arguments against religion, such as that implicit in David Hume’s Natural History of Religion.​[1]​ Evolutionary arguments have frequently been used to support moral scepticism. Richard Joyce, for example, argues “that descriptive knowledge of the genealogy of morals (in combination with some philosophizing) should undermine our confidence in moral judgments.”​[2]​ In contemporary philosophy, however, the most widely discussed form of evolutionary scepticism is probably that of Alvin Plantinga. He argues that if the mind has evolved by natural selection and if there is no creator God, then we have no reason to suppose that any of our beliefs are true. Plantinga does not actually advocate his evolutionary scepticism, of course. He uses it as a stick with which to beat the view that there is no creator God.​[3]​ The relevance of his argument to the present chapter is that it shows evolutionary scepticism can be directed at science and commonsense, as well as more traditional targets.
	
In a forthcoming paper Guy Kahane has outlined the general form of what he terms ‘evolutionary debunking arguments’:

Causal premise. S’s belief that p is explained by X 
Epistemic premise. X is an off-track process 
Therefore 
S’s belief that p is unjustified ​[4]​

An ‘off-track’ process is one that does not track truth: it produces beliefs in a manner that is not sensitive to whether those beliefs are true.

In Section two we will present the most straightforward reply to evolutionary debunking arguments. This is to flatly deny the epistemic premise in Kahane’s schema. Evolution is not an off-track process with respect to truth in some cognitive domain. Evolution will favour organisms that form true beliefs in that domain. In Section three we show that the standard argument that evolution does not track truth rests on a misunderstanding of natural selection, and we define the sense in which evolution does, indeed, track truth. We conclude that with this definition of truth-tracking there is a plausible ‘Milvian bridge’ defence of commonsense beliefs. In Section four we examine just how far such a defence will take us and suggest that the Milvian bridge can be extended to beliefs derived from the sciences. In later sections we consider a second way to deny the epistemic premises in Kahane’s schema, namely by giving a deflationary account of truth-claims in the relevant domain. Kahane and others have explored this response to evolutionary scepticism about morality; we consider it as a response to evolutionary scepticism about religion.


2. In Hoc Signo Vinces: Truth and Pragmatic Success

“Constantine…is reported to have seen with his own eyes the luminous trophy of the cross, placed above the meridian sun, and inscribed with the following words: BY THIS CONQUER. … Christ… directed Constantine to frame a similar standard, and to march, with the assurance of victory, against Maxentius and all his enemies.” 

Edward Gibbon Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire

When Constantine fought the battle at the Milvian bridge in 312, he adopted a new battle standard. This was the chi rho (☧), the first two Greek letters of the name “Christ”: ΧΡΙΣΤΟΣ. Constantine won, and went on to found the Byzantine Roman Empire. Did he win because of the power of the sign and the truth it denoted, or because his largely Christian soldiers were inspired to fight more effectively? Traditionally, many Christians have assumed the former. Constantine was successful because his beliefs were true: God was on his side.

We call an argument which links true belief to pragmatic success a ‘Milvian bridge’ argument. The specific kind of pragmatic success with which we will be concerned is evolutionary success. To defeat evolutionary scepticism, true belief must be linked to evolutionary success in such a way that evolution can be expected to produce organisms which have true beliefs. However, it would be too much to require that evolution produce organisms all of whose beliefs are true. Evolutionary theory must explain the world as it actually is, and we know that people and animals often form false beliefs. It would also be too much to require that evolution produce organisms whose beliefs are formulated in an ideal conceptual scheme – it ought to be possible for someone other than God or an ideal epistemic agent speaking at the ‘end of inquiry’ to have true beliefs.​[5]​ We suggest that a reasonable formulation of the Milvian Bridge principle would be something like this: 

Milvian Bridge: The X facts are related to the evolutionary success of X beliefs in such a way that it is reasonable to accept and act on X beliefs produced by our evolved cognitive faculties

We do not believe that a Milvian bridge can be constructed linking true religious beliefs to evolutionary success. Even a cursory examination of the leading contemporary accounts of the evolution of religious belief makes it clear that none of them make any reference to the truth or falsity of those beliefs when explaining their effects on reproductive fitness.​[6]​ Conversely, although the Milvian bridge argument has been endorsed by some religious thinkers in the past, and may persist in the vulgar theology of some religious traditions, few if any contemporary theologians accept that the relative truth of two religions can be decided in battle, or by counting their adherents. Believers may be guaranteed success in the afterlife, but they are not guaranteed the kind of success that is relevant to reproductive fitness.

However, while the Milvian Bridge has no serious standing in theology, it continues to be taken seriously as argument for the truth of scientific beliefs. Richard Dawkins makes use of this argument to contrast science and religion: “If all the achievements of scientists were wiped out tomorrow, there would be no doctors but witch doctors, no transport faster than horses, no computers, no printed books, no agriculture beyond subsistence peasant farming. If all the achievements of theologians were wiped out tomorrow, would anyone notice the smallest difference?”​[7]​ In the philosophy of science the so-called ‘ultimate argument’ or ‘miracle’ argument for scientific realism is closely related to the Milvian bridge. According to this argument, unless something very like the entities referred to by scientific theories actually exists, and unless those theories are at least approximately true, then the pragmatic success of the technologies derived from those theories would be miraculous.​[8]​ However, while this argument is still taken seriously, it is notoriously hard to formulate a version of the argument that does not prove either too much or too little.​[9]​ Too much if it suggests that technological success establishes the truth of the science from which it is derived. The industrial revolution, after all, was founded on Newtonian theories that we now know to be fundamentally mistaken. So we have good reason to suspect that even the most successful scientific theories are only stepping stones to new and different theories. Too little because once we water down the notion of truth to avoid the problem just raised, we risk defining truth in terms of pragmatic effectiveness and rendering the argument circular.

Fortunately, it is not necessary for us to settle the realism debate in the philosophy of science. In the next section we will construct a Milvian bridge linking commonsense beliefs about the world around us to evolutionary success. Having done so, we will sketch how the bridge might be extended to scientific beliefs. We will be content to show that it is reasonable to accept and act on scientific beliefs, and will not attempt to establish any particular form of scientific realism.

3. Building the Milvian Bridge: How evolution tracks truth

Many authors have argued that evolution will not produce cognitive systems which track truth. They argue as follows: Evolution will favour cognitive adaptations which produce beliefs that maximise an organism’s fitness irrespective of whether those beliefs are true. Hence, we should expect cognitive adaptations to be fitness-tracking rather than truth-tracking. We know that selection will often favour unreliable cognitive systems, which produce many false beliefs, over more reliable cognitive systems which would eliminate those false beliefs. This suggests that our evolved cognitive adaptations do not track truth.​[10]​ 

The extensive psychological literature on heuristics and biases in human cognition is a rich source of examples to underpin this argument. Human beings perform very badly on apparently simple reasoning tasks, committing a range of well-known fallacies. These effects are so widespread and so systematic that they are overwhelmingly likely to be intrinsic to the design of the human mind. People also exhibit a broad range of self-serving cognitive biases, giving them unrealistically positive views of themselves and their prospects. These traits correlate with mental well-being, giving rise to the phenomenon of ‘depressive realism’ in which mildly depressed people have more accurate self-perceptions. Hence these traits are also likely to be part of the design of the mind. 

But despite these facts, the fundamental selection pressure driving the evolution of cognition is truth-tracking. The very idea that fitness-tracking is an alternative to truth-tracking is confused. When the relation between the two is properly formulated it becomes clear that the various circumstances in which selection favours unreliable cognitive mechanisms all involve obtaining as much truth as possible given the constraints. All selection processes are constrained, or else organisms “would live for ever, would be impregnable to predators, would lay eggs at an infinite rate, and so on.”​[11]​ An unconstrainedly optimal cognitive system would have every true belief relevant to its activities and no false beliefs, but this is not possible. Evolution selects for truth tracking in the same sense that it optimises any other trait under selection – it does the best it can given the constraints. 
3.1 Why truth-tracking and fitness-tracking are not alternatives
It is an error to contrast truth-tracking and fitness-tracking because, as one of us has discussed at length elsewhere,​[12]​ this is to treat complementary explanations at different levels of analysis as if they were potential rivals at the same level of analysis. It is perfectly sensible to ask which of various properties of a trait under selection is the ‘target of selection:’ does blood contain haemoglobin because it binds oxygen, or because it is rich in iron, or both? Such questions have answers, at least in principle. They ask whether either or both of these properties enter into some lawlike generalisation about selection, so that they can figure in a selective explanation of the trait. But such questions presuppose that the two properties and the corresponding selection explanations are potential alternatives to one another. It makes no sense to ask if haemoglobins were selected for binding oxygen or for enhancing fitness. To regard these as alternative hypotheses about the evolution of haemoglobins is to confuse two, separate levels of explanation.

The classic way to determine which of two properties is the target of selection (or if both are) is to pose the counterfactual question ‘if either property had occurred without the other, would the trait have followed the same trajectory in the population?’​[13]​ If haemoglobins bound oxygen equally efficiently but did not contain iron, this would have no effect on selection. After all, many organisms – octopuses, for example – use copper-based respiratory proteins (haemocyanins). If haemoglobins bound oxygen less efficiently but were just as rich in iron, however, then this would have an immediate effect on selection. Such questions are meaningful when asked about properties which are potentially alternative targets of selection: it might be one or the other or both that has some nomic connection with fitness and we want to know which. But it we ask ‘would this trait have followed the same evolutionary trajectory if it lacked such-and-such a physical property but this made no difference to its fitness,’ we will always get the same answer: yes, and trivially so.   

An explanation of why one trait was selected rather than another in terms of their relative fitness is the most abstract level of evolutionary explanation. Treating traits as mere bearers of fitness values makes sense if one wishes to access the generalisations of population genetics while abstracting away from details which, in conventional evolutionary theory at least, make no difference to the evolutionary trajectories of populations.​[14]​ Given some number of alternative traits, their heritabilities, initial frequencies, fitness functions, the effective population size, and so forth we can compute their likely frequencies at some future time. But this explanation is in no sense a rival to an explanation which includes the underlying reasons why the alternative traits have those relative fitnesses in some particular case. The second explanation is an instance of the first, more general explanation.​[15]​

In summary, it is senseless to set up ‘fitness-tracking’ as an alternative to ‘truth-tracking’ because truth-tracking is a property at a lower level of explanation. It is a general measure of a certain kind of ecological interaction with the environment, akin to ‘foraging efficiency’ or ‘respiratory efficiency’, as we will see below. The claim that an organism succeeded because it was better than its rivals at tracking truth is comparable to the claim that it succeeded because it was a more efficient forager or had a better respiratory system. Abstract as they may be, these claims nevertheless stand to the claim that the organism succeeded because it was fitter as potential instances of that still more abstract explanation. 
3.2. Why evolution selects for truth-tracking
So the proposal that our evolved cognitive adaptations do not track truth cannot mean that they track fitness instead. It must mean that they track some other property which is a genuine alternative to truth at the same level of explanation. But, we will argue, the cognitive adaptations that give rise to the commonsense beliefs with the help of which we and other animals act on an everyday basis are not tracking any such alternative to truth. If they fail to track truth as effectively as they might, it is because they are tracking truth subject to constraints. The currency of evolutionary success in the domain of cognition is still truth.

The most fundamental constraint is cost. Cognition is very costly. The human brain makes up about 2% of body mass, but accounts for about 20% of oxygen consumption. Having beliefs, whether true or false, comes at a high price. Because cognition is so costly we can immediately rule out some evolutionary scenarios that have been proposed by evolutionary sceptics.​[16]​ The hypotheses that belief has no effect on behaviour, or that having beliefs reduces fitness, are non-starters. If this was the case then there would be strong selection for not having beliefs. The proposal that beliefs evolved by genetic linkage also has no plausibility: the relevant neural traits are complex and/or quantitative and their genetic basis is widely distributed across the genome. A surprising amount of attention has been given to Plantinga’s suggestion that most beliefs could be false, but that organisms might have wacky desires which, when added to the false beliefs, give rise to adaptive behavior: “Perhaps Paul very much likes the idea of being eaten, but when he sees a tiger, always runs off looking for a better prospect, because he thinks it unlikely the tiger he sees will eat him. This will get his body parts in the right place so far as survival is concerned, without involving much by way of true belief.”​[17]​ But the issue is not whether there is some combination of false beliefs and matching desires that could generate some adaptive behavior. The issue is whether evolution could design cognitive adaptations that consistently produce adaptive behavior by producing beliefs which are false and adjusting desires to fit. We submit that this is not possible. The only way to do it would be to have some other cognitive mechanisms which tracked truth, and which adjusted the desires in the light of the actual goals of the organism so as to ensure that the false beliefs nevertheless produced adaptive behavior. In that case, it would be the states of this, second mechanism that would be the effective beliefs and desires, and the false beliefs and wacky desires envisaged by Plantinga would be a bizarre and expensive detour between the effective beliefs and desires and the organism’s motor systems. 

We can safely conclude that beliefs are the output of a set of cognitive adaptations. Those adaptations are not designed to produce only true beliefs, or to produce all the relevant true beliefs on every occasion. But this is not because they are tracking some property other than truth. It is because they are tracking truth in a constrained manner.

Truth-tracking is strongly constrained by cost because organisms have limited resources and truth-tracking is not the only thing they need to do to survive. Resources allocated to forming true beliefs are resources unavailable for making sperm or eggs, or fighting off the effects of ageing by repairing damaged tissues. Modern humans in first-world countries lead a sheltered life and it is hard for us to appreciate just how direct these trade-offs can be. A dramatic example comes from a small Australian mammal, the Brown Antechinus (Antechinus Stuartii). In this and several related species a short, frenzied mating season is followed by a period during which the male’s sexual organs regress and their immune system collapses. Then all the males in the population die. The Antechinus has little chance of surviving to the next breeding season and so it allocates all of its resources to the reproductive effort and none to tissue maintenance. There can be little doubt that if, like us, the Antechinus had a massively hypertrophied cortex and engaged in a lot of costly thinking, it would allow that neural tissue to decay in the mating season so as to allocate more resources to sperm production and sexual competition. 

As Gerd Gigerenzer and collaborators have long argued, many of the best-known human failures of rationality can be understood as heuristics that sacrifice being right all the time for being right most of the time at a greatly reduced cost.​[18]​ A heuristic is a method for obtaining truth which does not guarantee a correct answer every time, but which get it right often enough that there is no point in adopting a more reliable but more costly method. A heuristic is not a method for obtaining something other than truth. So, while our use of simple heuristics does, indeed, show that truth is being traded off against fitness, what this means is that truth-tracking, a component of fitness, is being traded off against other components of fitness, such as sperm production. The same is true of our adaptations for locomotion – we could have stronger legs, but the cost would not be justified. This does nothing to question the view that the adaptive purpose of legs is locomotion. Just so, the existence of ‘bounded rationality’ does nothing to question the view that the adaptive purpose of the cognitive traits that give rise to beliefs is truth-tracking.

Another constraint arises from the intrinsic logical structure of many cognitive tasks. The structure of many tasks is such that it is logically impossible to form true beliefs without also forming some false beliefs. For example, whenever an organism needs to make a decision under uncertainty, then it is logically impossible to reduce the risk of type one errors without increasing the risk of type two errors (and vice-versa).  Type one errors involve accepting something that is not true. Type two errors involve rejecting something that is true. Since organisms very often need to act before absolutely conclusive information is available, they have to accept some risk of error. The evolutionary task they face is that of achieving an optimal balance between type one and type two errors.

The application of this observation to evolutionary psychology has been termed ‘error management theory’ and is the subject of a small scientific literature.​[19]​ Here, however, we want to emphasise the very general application of this kind of intrinsic task constraint. This point has been clearly made by Peter Godfrey-Smith​[20]​ using a class of evolutionary models called ‘signal detection theory’. In these models, organisms respond to signals which are less than perfectly reliable indicators of relevant states of affairs in the environment. From an information theoretic point of view the problem facing an organism which receives a signal is whether it is a veridical signal or whether it is noise (Figure 1). 

Insert figure 1 about here

Evolution will select organisms which decide to act, or which form an action-guiding belief, at whatever point along the horizontal axis is evolutionarily optimal (Xc). This point can be determined by combining the probabilities in Figure 1 with the values of the four possible outcomes: acting when the signal is veridical, acting when the signal is noise (type one error), not acting when the signal is veridical (type two error), and not acting when the signal is noise. The costs and benefits associated with these four outcomes are summarised in table 1. The net values of the four outcomes, and the probabilities of their obtaining for any value of X, determine the average payoff to the organism if that value is chosen as the threshold for action (or action-guiding belief). The value of X with the highest average payoff will be favoured by natural selection.

	Veridical Signal	Noise
Act	Benefit of successful action minus cost of action	No benefit, but still incur the cost of action









Table 1. Costs and benefits of acting or not acting in response to either a veridical signal or noise

This simple signal detection model embodies the lesson that tracking fitness and tracking truth are not alternatives. Clearly, the model assumes that organisms are tracking fitness – the selected value of X is the one with the highest average payoff. But if we ask why a given value of X has a given average payoff, the explanation will be in terms of truth-tracking. The explanation of the value of each cell in the payoff matrix is the fit or lack of fit between what the organism does and how the world is. Increases in fitness are explained by successful truth-tracking and reductions in fitness by failures in truth-tracking. Why does acting when the signal is veridical yield a gain in fitness? Because the animal acts as if the world is a certain way when the world is that way, and thus achieves its goals. Why does acting when the signal is noise yield a reduction in fitness? Because such an action would be frustrated by the way the world is, and thus constitute a waste of precious resources, etc (See Table 1). Godfrey-Smith puts the point like this: “…correspondence truth has a definite place in the signal detection approach. For, if C [the mental state formed on the basis of X] is regarded as representing S, hits and correct rejections are truths, while misses and false alarms are errors. So truth remains a definite goal of cognition, though the truth-linked virtue of ‘reliability’ is taken apart and overhauled.”​[21]​ 

In the light of the two classes of unavoidable constraints that we have identified – cost constraints and intrinsic task constraints - we can conclude that the evolutionary optimum of ‘truth tracking’ should be defined as obtaining as much truth and as little error as possible, given the intrinsic trade-offs between these two, with the balance between them determined by the value of the truths and the cost of the errors, and with possible solutions constrained by the cost of cognitive resources.​[22]​ This can be put in the form of a slogan:

Organisms track truth optimally if they obtain as much relevant truth as they can afford, and tolerate no more error that is needed to obtain it.

We propose that with this definition of truth-tracking it is overwhelmingly likely that commonsense beliefs are produced by cognitive adaptations that track truth. By ‘commonsense’ we mean those everyday beliefs which guide mundane action, and whose subjective certainty was famously appealed to by G.E Moore.​[23]​ Moore’s examples included the existence of his body, and of other human bodies and inanimate bodies, all arranged in space and time, as well as the fact that those other human bodies knew similar things. Any plausible account of the evolution of these sorts of beliefs in humans and other animals will be of the kind described in this section. At the heart of that explanation will be the fact that animals can increase their fitness by detecting states of affairs in the world and matching their actions to those states of affairs. 


4. A Bridge Too far? Commonsense and Science
4.1. Commonsense and the human Umwelt
Commonsense beliefs are couched in commonsense concepts, not the concepts of our best current science. Moore was certain that he had two hands, not that he had two instances of the distal portion of the pentadactyl limb. Our commonsense concepts are themselves an evolutionary inheritance, and we know that they differ systematically from those of other animals. So it is plausible that if our evolution had followed a different course, we would have a different conceptual scheme. Our first point in this section is that the evolution of cognition tracks truth in a sense that does not discriminate between the conceptual schemes of different species. To take a trivial example, the description of a bird’s plumage in my field guide is not false because it omits the patterns in the ultraviolet spectrum which the bird itself perceives. Nor are botanical illustrations fanciful because they omit the markings that are visible to insect pollinators or include colours that those insects cannot see. A more interesting example comes from the work of the pioneering ethologist Konrad Lorenz on the ‘world of the bird’. Lorenz argued that his birds (primarily Jackdaws, Corvus monedula) did not perceive other members of their species as instances of a single kind of animal with which they might, on different occasions, flock, fight, mate, or engage in parenting behavior. Instead, they occupied a world consisting of various ‘companions’. A ‘companion’ is an array of stimulus features which identifies something as the appropriate object of a suite of behaviors. So in Lorenz’s account of the bird’s world, a jackdaw is not surrounded by other jackdaws, but by flocking companions, mating companions, parenting companions, and so forth.​[24]​ From a human perspective, the jackdaws are missing something. But Lorenz’s jackdaws are not mistaken about their social world, any more than we are mistaken about the colours of birds and flowers. 

Lorenz’s work was an explicit application of the Estonian biologist Jacob von Uexkull’s concept of the Umwelt.​[25]​ The Umwelt of a species is the world described using the perceptual and conceptual categories available to that species. While the term itself is not widely used in modern behavioral biology, the concept remains essential: ‘The lesson from the past decade of studies on bird behaviour is: if you want to get inside an animal’s mind, it helps to see the world through its eyes.’​[26]​ This is because an animal responds to the world as the animal sees it and conceptualises it, and not as we do.

From an evolutionary perspective, the world of commonsense must be seen as the human Umwelt. Whatever ontological authority may attach to the concepts and categories of science, the commonsense way in which we see the world has no more or less ontological authority than the way in which birds see the world. A related point was famously made by the physicist Arthur Eddington in 1927 when he contrasted the commonsense understanding of his writing table as a solid object with the scientific understanding of it as an area of mostly empty space of which the best that can be said is that the probability of his elbow sinking through it was small enough to be neglected for the purpose of writing his lecture.​[27]​ There is a naïve response to facts of this kind according to which the idea that grass is green or that tables are solid are illusions foisted on us by our selfish genes, and there in reality are no green or solid objects, only electromagnetic radiation and quantum interactions.​[28]​ But there is no reason to abandon the world of commonsense, as long as we are prepared to accept that we are not the only animal whose evolved perceptual and conceptual schemes can stand alongside the measurement and conceptual schemes of science. One of the triumphs of science is that it allows us to appreciate the Umwelt of another species. In the human Umwelt male and female bluetits (Cyanistes caeruleus) are visually indistinguishable. In the bluetit Umwelt they are sexually dimorphic. This does not mean that truth is relative to a conceptual scheme, only that there are more truths to be had than are captured by the evolved conceptual scheme of either species. There are many ways of classifying the world which are not purely arbitrary and the fact that these classifications are constrained by reality explains why they have some degree of pragmatic utility​[29]​. One obvious philosophical framework in which to make sense of the fact that organisms can have true beliefs in many different evolved conceptual schemes would be ‘structural realism’. That is to say, we should have the same attitude to beliefs formulated in an evolved conceptual scheme that we have to the content of a successful but now superseded scientific theory like Newtonian physics. The fact that it is possible to have true beliefs using this conceptual apparatus is to be understood in terms of some degree of structural resemblance between that apparatus and the structure of the world (or of our current best theory, which we can treat as a surrogate for how things really are). However, there are many competing versions of structural realism and substantial ongoing philosophical debates about the position, so we will not attempt to develop this connection in more detail in this essay.​[30]​ 

The fact that humans track truth about human colours and bluetits track truth about bluetit colours can both be explained by selection for truth-tracking. Will our evolved faculties allow us to move beyond the world of commonsense? Darwin worried about this, as more notoriously did Alfred Russell Wallace: our faculties will be adequate for practical life, but why suppose they are adequate for higher mathematics or metaphysics? Wallace famously thought evolution insufficient to account for these capacities, and so concluded that some higher process – Spirit – caused them. It is to this issue we now turn. Can selection for truth-tracking can explain how science tracks truth?

4.2. Darwin’s real doubt: How far will our evolved faculties take us?
We began this essay with the quotation which has come to be known as ‘Darwin’s doubt’. It is supposed to show that Darwin himself entertained evolutionary scepticism. The context of the quotation, however, makes it clear that Darwin what was sceptical about was how far beyond the world of commonsense our evolved faculties would take us.  Darwin was responding to the author of a philosophical work. He writes:

“You would not probably expect anyone fully to agree with you on so many abstruse subjects; and there are some points in your book which I cannot digest. The chief one is that the existence of so-called natural laws implies purpose. I cannot see this. … But I have had no practice in abstract reasoning and I may be all astray Nevertheless you have expressed my inward conviction, though far more vividly and clearly than I could have done, that the Universe is not the result of chance. But then with me the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man's mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey's mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?​[31]​

Another famous letter gives some insight into Darwin’s attitude to the limitations of the human intellect:

I am inclined to look at everything as resulting from designed laws, with the details, whether good or bad, left to the working out of what we may call chance. Not that this notion at all satisfies me. I feel most deeply that the whole subject is too profound for the human intellect. A dog might as well speculate on the mind of Newton.— Let each man hope & believe what he can.​[32]​

Darwin is suggesting an epistemic boundedness thesis. We know there are limitations on the conceptual abilities of other animals. Dogs will never able to master calculus. This leads to the suspicion that there may be truths that we ourselves are constitutionally unable to entertain. But Darwin was quite confident that our faculties were adequate to unravel the workings of nature. The historian Jon Hodge has described how the young Darwin argued on theological grounds for both the inability of the human mind to fathom the mind of the creator and the ability of the human mind to understand creation itself, a position Hodge describes as ‘cognitive optimism about nature’.​[33]​ 

In this section we will argue that whether or not there are some ultimate limits to our ability to improve our conceptual scheme, we are not simply confined to our evolved conceptual scheme and we have not yet reached the limits of our ability to bootstrap ourselves into more adequate conceptual schemes.  We will then argue that, given that our cognitive adaptations track truth in the realm of commonsense, we have reasons to believe that we can derive reliable knowledge in the more adequate conceptual schemes of science.

Our argument that humans are not confined to their evolved conceptual scheme is an appeal to the history of science. No human being had the concepts of differentiation and integration before Leibniz and Newton’s introduction of the calculus. After two thousand years of speculation about physical theory the space of possible dynamical theories was completely altered. As a result, for the past four hundred years educated people have regularly had thoughts that no hominin had in the previous four hundred thousand. Other dramatic examples include the ‘probability revolution’​[34]​ of the nineteenth century, and the spatialisation of time.​[35]​ In this respect, human beings are very different from bluetits, and even from other primates. There is no precedent in other animals for radical changes in the structure of the Umwelt caused by individual cognitive innovations which spread by cultural diffusion.

The argument that this process has not come to an end is a simple appeal to the current state of science and to informed opinion about its likely future. It is obvious that more conceptual innovations like those just described are likely to occur, and we will not labour the point. 

If human beings are able to supplement their evolved conceptual scheme with new concepts of their own invention, should we have confidence that our cognitive faculties can track truth in this new, enriched conceptual framework? We have argued above that our cognitive faculties were selected because they tracked truth in the human Umwelt. But they were not selected for their ability to do calculus, or to reason using the probability calculus (as we see from our systematic neglect of base rates and similar phenomena), or for their ability to use very indirect evidence to reconstruct the distant past. So there is no direct Milvian bridge linking these particular cognitive processes to pragmatic success.

Instead, there is an indirect Milvian bridge. There is a Milvian bridge connecting our commonsense beliefs to pragmatic success, and we can use commonsense to justify the methods by which we arrive at our scientific beliefs. The reasons we have to think that our scientific conclusions are correct and that the methods we use to reach them are reliable are simply the data and arguments which scientists give for their conclusions, and for their methodological innovations. Ultimately, these have to be able to stand up to the same kind of commonsense scrutiny as any other addition to our beliefs. The conviction that the base rate fallacy is a fallacy, and that we should guard against our tendency to commit it when reasoning informally, does not rest on a decision to follow probabilistic reasoning wherever it leads, but on evaluating the argument. When a piece of very similar reasoning leads to a conclusion that does not stand up to commonsense evaluation – such as the argument for paying an unlimited amount for a ticket in the St Petersburg game​[36]​ – we conclude that there is an error somewhere in that reasoning. 

Thus, if evolution does not undermine our trust in our cognitive faculties, neither should it undermine our trust in our ability to use those faculties to debug themselves – to identify their own limitations, as in perceptual illusions or common errors in intuitive reasoning. Nor should it undermine our confidence in adopting new concepts and methods which have not themselves been shaped by the evolution of the mind, but whose introduction can be justified using our evolved cognitive faculties. The Milvian bridge can be extended to science.


5. Evolutionary skepticism and ethics
In the previous two sections we have argued that evolutionary skepticism about commonsense and science fails. Evolutionary skepticism about commonsense is defeated by the existence of a Milvian bridge connecting the reliability of our cognitive faculties in the world of commonsense – the human Umwelt – to evolutionary success. Evolutionary skepticism about science is defeated by the fact that our trust in science can be justified using commonsense arguments. In this section we turn to evolutionary skepticism about ethics.

Evolutionary accounts of ethics precede Darwin, being the basis of Herbert Spencer’s ethical system.​[37]​ After Darwin, Spencer championed a slightly revised version of his evolutionary ethics incorporating natural selection.​[38]​ But both evolutionists​[39]​ and moral philosophers​[40]​ soon reached the conclusion that moral value was something that evolution, and indeed nature in general, could not deliver. G.E. Moore’s well-known Naturalistic Fallacy, which purports to show that goodness is not a natural property, was targeted directly at Spencer’s evolutionary progressivism.​[41]​ Evolutionary ethics has had some lukewarm revivals since that time, most recently in the mid-1980s following its defense by Michael Ruse and Robert Richards.​[42]​ 

In his recent paper, Kahane argues that evolution is not only unable to provide a foundation for morality, but in fact debunks moral truth.​[43]​ The basic pattern of argument is one that will by now be familiar: evolution by natural selection tracks fitness rather than truth. The evolution of the moral sense is an ‘off-track’ process because it has no intrinsic tendency to produce a moral sense that tracks moral truths. Kahane gives the argument as follows: 

1. Causal premise. Our evolutionary history explains why we have the evaluative beliefs we have. 
2. Epistemic premise. Evolution is not a truth-tracking process with respect to evaluative truth.
3. Evaluative scepticism. None of our evaluative beliefs is justified.

The idea that evolution is an off-track process with respect to evaluative truth can be seen at work in Darwin’s classic discussion of the evolution of morality: 

“In the same manner as various animals have some sense of beauty, though they admire widely different objects, so they might have a sense of right and wrong, though led by it to follow widely different lines of conduct. If, for instance, to take an extreme case, men were reared under precisely the same conditions as hive-bees, there can hardly be a doubt that our unmarried females would, like the worker-bees, think it a sacred duty to kill their brothers, and mothers would strive to kill their fertile daughters; and no one would think of interfering.”​[44]​

Darwin argues that if our ecology had been different, then we would judge different things to be right and wrong, just as different species of animals judge different things to be beautiful. Animals are aesthetically attracted to things to which it is fitness-enhancing for them to be attracted. Just so, Darwin argues, they will morally approve of actions which it is fitness-enhancing for them to approve. This would seem to imply either that evolution is an off-track process with respect to evaluative truth, or that evaluative truths are truths about what maximises reproductive fitness. If this is right, then the only alternative to moral scepticism would, indeed, be evolutionary ethics.​[45]​

There is no Milvian bridge connecting moral truth to pragmatic success and thus defending morality from evolutionary skepticism. This is because contemporary evolutionary explanations of morality, just like Darwin’s own explanation, do not involve any adaptive advantages produced by detecting and acting in accordance with objective moral facts.​[46]​ But Kahane notes that the assumption that moral truths correspond to objective moral facts is one that is questioned by many moral philosophers for independent reasons. The evolutionary skeptical argument against ethics would be better stated as follows:

1. Causal premise. Our evolutionary history explains why we have the evaluative beliefs we have. 
2. Epistemic premise. Evolution is not a truth-tracking process with respect to evaluative truth.
3. Metaethical assumption. Objectivism (moral realism) is the correct account of evaluative discourse 
C. Evaluative scepticism. None of our evaluative beliefs is justified.

If we deny the assumption that evaluative beliefs denote moral realities then the conclusion fails to follow. Non-cognitivist ethical theories, according to which the function of ethical judgments is not to express facts but to do something like express allegiance to a norm, remain a significant force in contemporary moral philosophy.​[47]​ Moreover, it has been argued that some forms of cognitivism escape the evolutionary debunking argument because their account of moral truths does not involve the existence of moral facts which need to be ‘tracked’ in the manner envisaged by the argument.​[48]​ So the evolutionary debunking argument is best conceived as an argument against strong forms of moral realism, rather than simply against moral truth. 

The case of ethics makes clear that there are actually two ways to respond to an evolutionary debunking argument. The first is to build a Milvian bridge, and argue that for some cognitive domain X, our beliefs are related to the facts in such a way that evolution will select cognitive faculties which track truth in that domain. The second is to argue that what is meant by ‘truth’ in a certain cognitive domain is not a matter of tracking some external state of affairs, so that the question of whether evolution is an off-track process in that domain does not arise. In the next section we ask if either of these responses is available when evolutionary skepticism is applied to religious beliefs.


6. Evolutionary skepticism and religion

The various modes of worship, which prevailed in the Roman world, were all considered by the people as equally true; by the philosopher, as equally false, and by the magistrate, as equally useful.

Edward Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire

As we stated in Section two, we do not believe that a Milvian bridge is available for religious beliefs, because none of the leading contemporary accounts of the evolution of religious belief makes any reference to the truth or falsity of those beliefs when explaining their effects on reproductive fitness. This is true both of evolutionary theories which explain religion as a side-effect of other adaptations, and those which explain it as an adaptation in its own right. For example, on one approach to the evolution of religion, belief in God is an adaptation in its own right. However, this is because it is fitness-enhancing to advertise in a clear and hard to fake manner your membership of your community, so that you can access its support and protection when you need it.​[49]​ On this theory, Constantine’s new battle standard was a signal to his Christian troops that members of their community would receive the protection of the state, as indeed they did in an imperial edict of the following year. His victory was due to social solidarity rather than divine intervention.

The prominent theory of David Sloan Wilson shows the same lack of concern with the specific content of religious beliefs. On this account, religion evolved through a process of multi-level selection. Its evolution was driven by the benefits which social cohesion and prosocial behavior provide at the level of the group.​[50]​ Nothing in this explanation discriminates between true and false religious beliefs. Constantine’s victory occurred because his more predominantly Christian army approximated a superorganism like an ant colony slightly more closely that did the more predominantly pagan army of Maxentius, not because Christianity was true and paganism false.  

Contemporary theories which explain the evolution of religion as a side-effect are equally undiscriminating. The idea that religious belief is to a large extent the result of mental adaptations for agency detection has been endorsed by several leading evolutionary theorists of religion, including Pascal Boyer, Scott Atran and Justin L. Barrett.​[51]​ Broadly, these theorists suggest that there are specialized mental mechanisms for the detection of agency behind significant events. These have evolved because the detection of agency – ‘who did that and why?’ – has been a critical task facing human beings throughout their evolution. Religious belief has been jokingly described as ‘taking the universe personally’, and on this account, that is precisely correct. 

None of the contemporary evolutionary explanations of religious beliefs hypothesizes that those beliefs are produced by a mechanism that tracks truth. This may seem puzzling, given that we have argued above that the evolution of cognition is driven by truth-tracking. But the contradiction is only an apparent one. The side-effect explanation of religious belief is completely in line with the models we have sketched above. If the agency detection account is correct, then people believe in supernatural agents which do not exist for the same reason that birds sometimes mistake objects passing overhead for raptors. These beliefs are type one errors and they are the price of avoiding more costly type two errors. The adaptive explanations of religion work somewhat differently. They identify a way in which a sophisticated cognitive system could evolve a positively selected departure from truth-tracking. But this explanation presumes that the underlying cognitive system has evolved in the way we sketched above, with truth-tracking as its fundamental aim. This pattern of dependency between the two explanations cannot be reversed, any more than the explanation of the pseudo-penis and pseudo-scrotum of female hyenas​[52]​ could be turned into an explanation of the evolution of the penis and scrotum, with male, intromissive penises developing as a side-effect! Like the pseudo-penis, religious beliefs are a specialized secondary adaptation found in a small number of species and based on more a basic adaptation that can be found in very many species and which evolved for the same fundamental reason in all those species. It is entirely consistent to argue that penises evolved for intromission, but that pseudo-penises evolved through mimicry. In the same manner, a single, integrated account of the evolution of cognition can argue that the basic evolutionary dynamic that produced cognition is truth-tracking, but that certain, specialized classes of beliefs evolved as secondary adaptations for promoting social solidarity. 

If a Milvian bridge cannot be constructed linking the truth of religious beliefs to evolutionary success, then the alternative is to argue that the truth of religious beliefs is not a matter of their tracking some state of affairs in the world. There have been several attempts by academic theologians to purge religion of its claims about the supernatural, one of the best known being the ‘Sea of Faith’ movement headed by Don Cupitt.​[53]​ The evolutionary theorist of religion David Sloan Wilson has also suggested that the theological beliefs associated with a religious tradition may be more or less epiphenomenal with respect to its functioning as a social institution and that they may be perceived by the adherents of the faith as mere ‘preacher talk’.​[54]​  However, liberal theologians like Cupitt have usually been perceived as heretical by ordinary believers. We are skeptical that the vast majority of religious believers could be persuaded to accept a non-cognitivist or a fictionalist theology. 






Evolutionary debunking arguments suggest that the evolutionary origins of our cognitive faculties should undermine our confidence in the beliefs which those faculties produce. Perhaps unsurprisingly, it has turned out that the force of this skeptical argument depends on the specific class of beliefs. We have argued that it has no force against commonsense, factual beliefs. In this cognitive domain natural selection will design cognitive faculties which track truth in the sense that they obtain as much relevant truth as the organism can afford, and tolerate no more error that is needed to obtain it. This is enough to build what we have called a ‘Milvian Bridge’: The commonsense facts are related to the evolutionary success of commonsense beliefs in such a way that it is reasonable to accept and act on commonsense beliefs produced by our evolved cognitive faculties. 

We have further argued that evolutionary scepticism about scientific beliefs is unsuccessful because there are commonsense justifications of the processes by which we arrive at our scientific beliefs. 

Evolutionary debunking arguments have more force when applied to ethical beliefs. Drawing on Kahane’s work we have argued that evolutionary accounts of the origins of moral intuitions should undermine confidence in those intuitions if moral beliefs are given a strongly realist interpretation. But non-cognitivist moral philosophers, and perhaps some less ambitious moral realists, are unaffected by the evolutionary debunking argument, since they reject the idea that moral beliefs are in the business of tracking moral facts.

Finally, we have argued that religious beliefs emerge as particularly vulnerable to evolutionary debunking arguments, since neither class of counterargument seems to be viable in that domain. Current evolutionary theory really does support the view that human beings would have religious beliefs even if all religious beliefs were uniformly false.
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